Enchères inversées électroniques : atouts et limites pour la fonction achat

Karine BRISSET; François MARECHAL

doi:10.53102/2011.30.04.829

Auteurs

Karine BRISSET Université de Franche-Comté
François MARECHAL Université de Franche-Comté

DOI :

https://doi.org/10.53102/2011.30.04.829

Mots-clés :

Achat, Enchère inversèe électronique, Relation fournisseurs producteurs

Résumé

Les enchères inversées électroniques constituent depuis 10 ans un nouvel outil de négociation dans le cadre des transactions B-To-B. Ces procédures sont le sujet de nombreuses controverses chez les acheteurs professionnels comme chez les fournisseurs. Afin de mieux comprendre ces outils, cet article analyse en détail les enjeux qui se cachent derrière les différents formats d'enchères et s'appuient sur les résultats les plus récents d'expériences en laboratoire. Il compare différents formats d'enchères inversées dans un cadre simple et analyse les réponses stratégiques attendues des fournisseurs. Il met en avant les opportunités nouvelles offertes par des formats d'enchères plus complexes. Enfin, il présente les différents comportements opportunistes possibles qui émanent des acheteurs et des fournisseurs, acteurs de ces procédures, et apporte des solutions pour limiter leurs effets.

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